

ER - 11-7207
[Signature]

26 August 1959

MEMORANDUM FOR: General Cabell

SUBJECT : Emergency Planning

25X1

1. The attached is a Joint Staff revision of a guidance memorandum prepared by [redacted]. It has been okayed by both General Erskine and General Breitweizer, and they believe it should be presented to the USIB for approval and transmission to the committees now working on emergency plans. Both Generals Erskine and Breitweizer will be most happy to discuss this matter with you if you so desire.

2. None of the Joint Staff people or Generals Erskine and Breitweizer were in favor of the longer paper prepared by [redacted] (attached) as they thought it would tend to confuse rather than help the committees.


25X1

3. My personal view is that these committees need some focal point to obtain advice and guidance on this complex problem. I suggest that it would be beneficial to constitute the following people as an informal working group to advise the committees and coordinate their efforts: [redacted] and [redacted] in CIA, Colonel Lee C. Miller of the Joint Staff, and Mr. Randolph Zander of General Erskine's office in the Pentagon.

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Asst. to the DD/C

Attachments: (2)

JCS Check List

DD/C Proposal Dtd. 13 Aug 59

(EXCERPT FROM)
[Redacted]

[Signature]

JCS review(s) completed.

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[redacted]
Asst. to the DD/C

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DD/C Proposal Dtd. 13 Aug 59

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D R A F T

CHECK LIST

[Suggestions for AGREED GUIDANCE for Emergency Planning
by Intelligence Board Committees

United States

1. Committees should direct their planning primarily towards determining which intelligence activities under their present purview will be essential to the war effort, towards determining how these activities should be continued, and towards making provisions for insuring continued intelligence support to the Government under conditions of nuclear attack.
2. Committees must coordinate their plans with appropriate departments and agencies to insure the physical relocation of those intelligence resources essential to the wartime needs of the intelligence community.
3. Committee Planning should consider a "spectrum" or range of varying degrees of success in relocation (to include considerations of loss of personnel and files, destruction of facilities and communications, etc).
4. Committees should assume that intelligence support by all members of the community will be needed by both the civilian and military top authorities, i.e., by:
 - a. President and NSC.
 - b. Joint Chiefs of Staff to support their military decisions and ^{their} recommendations to the President and NSC.
 - c. The Department of State to support its foreign policy recommendations to the President.
5. In connection with their planning, the Chairman and members of each Committee should be charged with familiarizing themselves with present Relocation and Civil Defense planning of the Government, including particularly:
 - a. Evacuation plans for the District of Columbia (not yet finalized).
 - b. OCDM "assumptions" as to the extent of nuclear disruption to be expected from a Soviet nuclear attack.
(Officially published.)

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PROPOSED DRAFT

O-1D/C
13 August 1959

INTERPRETIVE COMMENTS

on AGREED GUIDANCE for Emergency Planning

(Prepared by O-1D for Coordination in consultation with Staffs of OSD,
Joint Staff and DDCI/CIA)

"1. The committees' planning should not, primarily, be to determine how they will -- as committees -- function in an emergency, but to ensure that intelligence activities under their present purview can continue to provide intelligence support to the Government under nuclear-attack conditions."

Whether or not a particular committee should seek to function actively in an emergency should be incidental to the major objective of ensuring that community intelligence activities (as distinct from committee activities) will carry on. In any event the question of whether or not a committee will function actively is likely to prove largely academic -- since it should be recognized that committee meetings will be impractical (except in exceptional cases) in the first weeks following nuclear attack. If there is major nuclear fall-out it will be necessary to minimize physical movement between relocation centers -- and such movement may be quite impossible for at least three to six weeks after nuclear attack on the U. S. Relocation sites may be extensively damaged so that they may not be useable for prolonged periods. Personnel arriving at relocation sites may be severely limited in numbers and skills as a result of casualties suffered in the initial attack. Transportation may be disrupted or may be required for other purposes of higher priority so that committee members will be unable to travel to meeting places. The Committees should develop plans to ensure that all pertinent informational and analytical support available in the community can be provided to priority intelligence problems through such arrangements as, e.g.: (1) integrated liaison, (2) secure long distance communication among analytical centers, (3) integration of certain specialized analysts into key headquarters staffs in case liaison arrangements break down and it is necessary to delegate normal departmental analytical responsibilities (particularly of non-Board agencies such as Agriculture and Interior) and/or (4) such special "getting together" of key staffs as may be feasible.

"2. Committees must not assume that planning for physical relocation of intelligence components will be adequately provided for by over-all departmental emergency planning -- which may lose sight of some important community intelligence-support needs."

The Committees should" (1) take steps or (2) make recommendations designed to ensure that the analytical and

material intelligence assets under their present general purview will be available to the community in locations protected -- so far as practicable -- from blast and fall-out and connected by "hardened" communications facilities with overseas sources of current intelligence, and with one another. A distinction should be made between the limited extent of "hardening" or other special physical arrangements possible within the near future, and that which may become possible in later years (say by 1962-3, or by 1965 or later) when time and budgeting may permit substantial improvements in present preliminary relocation arrangements for intelligence components.

"3. Committee planning should consider a "spectrum" or range of varying degrees of success in relocation (to include considerations of loss of personnel and files, destruction of facilities and communications, etc.)."

Planning should assume that emergency plans would be put into effect either by (1) the decision of the President that Government agencies shall relocate (in whole or as advance cadres) or (2) actual attack on the continental United States -- whichever is first. Accordingly, the individual committees should consider the probable effect on activities under their purview of different degrees of successful relocation of the assets on which these activities are dependent; for example, (a) successful advance relocation of most intelligence facilities with only limited disruption to physical facilities and communications, (b) successful advance location of limited key cadres, (c) no advance relocation and considerable blast and fall-out destruction to personnel and communications -- with certain components eliminated entirely and (perhaps) 25 to 50 percent effectiveness of remaining cadres, and (d) complete destruction of the bulk of intelligence personnel, background information, facilities and communications arrangements, but with several key cadres successfully relocated in emergency facilities and able to carry on with greatly reduced assets and emergency communications arrangements. In this connection, the community might well test and sharpen its ability to produce intelligence, from raw data, under "field" conditions, using only the analytical "know-how" and the background knowledge in the heads of key relocation cadres.

"4. Committees should assume that intelligence support from all members of the community -- individually and/or jointly -- will be needed by both the civilian and military top authorities, i.e. by:

"a. The President and the NSC at [redacted], normally through DCI and NSC Planning Board at [redacted]

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"b. The Joint Chiefs of Staff to support their own decisions as well as their recommendations to the President and the NSC -- [redacted].

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"c. The Department of State to support its foreign policy recommendations to the President -- [redacted]

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To discharge these needs will require assuring effective and secure communications among the various headquarters and analytical staffs surviving -- with the view of making available to all, pertinent intelligence produced by any. Planning to ensure the availability of intelligence support should be largely independent of the actual command or jurisdictional channels through which such intelligence support may in fact become channeled under the emergency conditions of widespread and severe nuclear destruction. Accordingly, the above assumption is not intended to pre-judge how the Head of Government will elect to get the advice on which he bases his command decisions -- but rather to establish the probability that all three of the principal staffs concerned (Defense, State and CIA) will have to be drawn on, to the extent of their surviving capabilities, to provide intelligence support to whatever offices or officials are making top-level decisions at that time.

"5. In connection with their planning, the Chairman and members of each Committee should be charged with familiarizing themselves with present Relocation and Civil Defense planning of the Government, including:

"a. Evacuation plans for the District of Columbia (not yet finalized)."

"b. OCIM 'assumptions' as to the extent of nuclear disruption to be expected from a Soviet nuclear attack. (Officially published.)"

It is prerequisite that those concerned with emergency planning be thoroughly familiar with the relocation plans of their own department or agency, to determine whether those plans provide for the personnel and facilities necessary to carry out the activities for which planning is being developed or reviewed by their committee. Particular attention should be paid to the problem of widespread nuclear "fall-out" and the practical means available for "hardening" relocation sites or selecting sites in areas with a probable low intensity of fall-out.

TRANSMITTAL SLIP		DATE 3 Sept. 59
TO: DDCI	ER	
ROOM NO. 203	BUILDING Admin	
REMARKS: your files. For file, please. Km O/DDCI 9/4/59		
STAT		
FROM:		
ROOM NO.	EXTENSION	
STAT 334	Admin.	

FORM NO. 241
1 FEB 55REPLACES FORM 36-8
WHICH MAY BE USED.

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

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Please see []
 + arrange USIB
 dissemin. of short
 memo.

CPC

27 AUG 1959

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